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Abstract 
One of the important aspects in the design of social protection is coverage. In Peru, as 
in most Latin American countries, social security participation is compulsory only for 
workers in the formal sector.  There is a large sector of the population for which 
participation is voluntary.  This paper investigates the determinants of enrolment to 
the pension system in Peru.  In particular, we found that a selected group of people i.e. 
married males with at least secondary education, high income and with other family 
members already participating in the pension system, have a higher likelihood of 
participation. Moreover, the results also suggest that family based safety nets have a 
negative effect on the probability of pension participation.  
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1. Introduction 
Since Chile replaced its public pay-as-you-go pension system with a private 
funded and managed system in 1981, many other Latin American countries have 
followed the Chilean example.   This reformed pension system is based on individual 
capitalization and managed by private administrators under government supervision.  
It is more fiscally sustainable than the old system and also contributes to the 
development of the financial market1.  However, Queiseer (1998), after evaluating the 
pension reforms in several Latin American countries2, identifies some challenges 
related to their long run sustainability and effectiveness: the problem of affiliation and 
effective coverage, the high level of administrative costs, the uniformity of the 
pension fund’s portfolio and the problem of establishing an efficient annuity market to 
provide adequate retirement pensions. 
Workers of informal firms and the self-employed are not obliged to participate 
in social security in many Latin American countries.   Indeed the problem of taking 
out a private pension and hence, the limited pension coverage3 is one of the main 
weaknesses of both the old and reformed pension system in Latin America.     Table 1 
shows that in 2003 and in relation to the economically active population (EAP), 56% 
of the workforce is enrolled in the private pension system (SPP) but only 24% 
contribute to any private pension administrator.  The low enrolment and the 
discrepancy between the number of affiliates and number of workers who are actually 
contributing to their pension funds cast serious doubts about adequate provisions for 
old age.   With the exception of Argentina, Ecuador, Dominican Republic and 
                                                 
1 See Uthoff (2001), Schmidt-Hebbel (1999) and Holzmann (1997). 
2 She provides an interesting comparison of the pension experiences of Peru, Colombia, Argentina, 
Uruguay, Mexico, Bolivia and El Salvador. 
3 Coverage is defined as the ratio of people insured (in any pension system) to population (or 
economically active population).  
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Uruguay, affiliation to the pension system is for life and compulsory only for 
dependent workers (i.e. ‘formal’ sector).  Therefore, the low percentages reflect the 
large ‘informal’ sector (unofficial sector beyond government regulation and taxation) 
for which affiliation to the SPP is voluntary4.  Enrolment does not necessarily imply 
contribution to the pension fund because independent workers might default on their 
pension contributions, dependent workers might leave the labour market or change 
jobs to start their own business, etc. Poverty also causes low coverage because limited 
resources of the family must be allocated to the most immediate needs. 
This paper aims to examine what prompts Peruvians to invest in a private 
pension and therefore, provide explanations for the low pension coverage. Peru 
reformed its pension system in 1993 and similar to other Latin American countries, 
the affiliation to any pension system (public or private) is mandatory for formal 
employees and voluntary for the rest.  Peru is an interesting case study because of its 
low pension coverage and large informal sector. The International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) estimated that over 50% of the 2000 Peruvian urban labour force 
was ‘informal’ 5 and according to table 1, only 30% of the EAP was enrolled in the 
SPP and 12% contributed to their accounts in 2003.   
Recent studies (Cox and Edwards, 2002; Holzmann et al, 2000; Packard et al, 
2002 and Barr and Packard, 2003) have also tried to uncover the determinants of 
enrolment to the private pension system in Latin American countries.  They applied a 
binary choice model but without distinguishing between compulsory and voluntary 
affiliation.  Note that in countries with a large number of ‘informal’ workers for 
                                                 
4 See Jimenez and Cuadros (2003) for explanations linking low pension coverage and the informal 
sector. 
5 The ILO definition of informal sector includes all own-account workers (excluding professionals and 
technicians) and unpaid family workers, and employers and employees working in establishments with 
less than 6 persons engaged. Paid domestic workers are excluded.  
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whom enrolment in pension schemes is voluntary, their test can be interpreted as one 
of examining the determinants of participation in the ‘formal’ sector rather than 
pension enrolment.  We consider that it is not adequate to include in the analysis 
people who are forced to enrol because they do not have any choice. Moreover, 
empirical results quoted without this distinction might not provide an accurate 
assessment of the possibility of increasing the pension coverage.   We contribute to 
the existing research by using data from the Peruvian household survey (ENAHO, 
2001-IV), which distinguishes between compulsory and voluntary affiliation.  
Furthermore, it would have been desirable to differentiate between workers who do or 
do not contribute to their pension funds but most of the household surveys do not 
provide information about their contribution pattern6. In fact, most of the surveys ask 
only if the person belongs to the pension system without asking if the enrolment was 
compulsory or voluntary.   
In addition, we also test for the importance of the extended family and the 
family-based safety nets7.   The extended family plays a prominent role in Peru and as 
a result, informal family arrangements might help protect family members from risks, 
losses and ageing. Thus, informal family safety nets could act as substitutes for formal 
social security.  Nevertheless, policy-makers are concerned about both the 
sustainability and the effectiveness of informal social security schemes in protecting 
the elderly from poverty (Holzmman et al, 2000). A better understanding of the 
                                                 
6 Barr and Packard (2003) is an exception.  They used a specially designed survey where about 1000 
Peruvians living in Lima were asked about their contribution to their pension accounts, but they were 
not asked if their affiliation was voluntary or compulsory. 
7 These informal arrangements may be indirectly observed through family size, investments in children 
education (Jellal, 2002), informal old-age security provided by children (Hoddinott, 1992), help from 
elderly to their children in domestic tasks, risk-sharing agreements between family members (Kotikloff 
and Spivak, 1981; Victorio, 2002), co-residence, etc.  
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affiliation motive might prove helpful in designing policies that could help to increase 
coverage and indirectly attenuate these problems. 
Our results suggest that the profile of the individual with an option to enrol in 
any AFP belongs to a reduced and exclusive group in any developing country.  Only 
married males with more than secondary education, high income and with other 
members already participating in the formal social security have a chance to enrol. 
Previous informal family agreements reduce the possibilities of expansion of the 
pension coverage.  
 The paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 briefly describes the Peruvian 
pension system.  Section 3 presents the theoretical framework which is based on a 
modified version of Kotikloff and Spivak (1981) and Brown (1999). Section 4 
specifies the empirical model and discusses the data and hypothesis.  Section 5 
analyses the results from regressions and finally, section 6 concludes the paper.   
 
2. The pension system in Peru 
Similar to Chile, Peru reformed its old pension system toward one based on 
individual capitalization where pensions depend directly on the amount of 
contributions accumulated.   But unlike Chile, Peru has not dismantled the pay-as-
you-go public pension system completely. The old defined state benefit system 
Sistema Nacional de Pensiones (SNP) co-exists with the new private pension system 
(SPP) but in practice, it is gradually closing (see table 2).   The government has 
indirectly restricted the access to the SNP8. Workers affiliated to the public system 
can remain there or switch to the private system at any time. Transfers from the 
private system to the public system are not allowed unless there is proven illegal 
                                                 
8 The army and the police force have an independent social security system.  
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malpractice in the process of affiliation9.  First time dependent workers can choose 
between the SNP and the SPP but if no decision is made within ten days of starting 
the job, they will automatically be enrolled in the SPP.  In addition, workers already 
enrolled to the SNP but changing jobs have to confirm that they want to remain in the 
SNP otherwise they will be automatically transferred to the SPP10.   
Affiliation to any pension system is mandatory for dependent workers but not 
for independent workers (e.g. the self-employed, household workers, etc.) for whom 
affiliation is voluntary.  As explained earlier, new dependent workers can choose to 
enrol in any pension system; but independent workers have to decide first to enrol or 
not in any pension system and then, to choose between the public and private system.  
Unfortunately, household survey data does not provide information on how many 
independent workers chose to affiliate to the SNP11.  However in some cases it is 
possible to infer how many dependent and independent workers chose to enrol in the 
SPP. 
The level of pension coverage in Peru is low. In 2003, almost 3 million people 
were enrolled in any AFP but only 1.1 million were contributing to the fund. These 
figures represented 30% and 12% of the EAP (see table 1).   
The private pension system (SPP) has led to the emergence of private 
institutions called Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (AFP) in charge of 
managing the pension funds.  The system is simple since workers enrol in only one 
AFP at a time and contribute with a fixed percentage of their incomes during their 
working lives.  These funds are accumulated in an individual account until the 
individual reach the retirement age  (65 for men and women). At this time, the 
                                                 
9 Legislative decree RS 185-99-EF/SAFP.   
10 Legislative decree DS 054-97-EF. 
11  In 2003, out of the total number of workers contributing to any pension scheme, 73% did to the SPP.      
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accumulated balance remains in the AFP or is transferred to an insurance company 
that converts it to a monthly pension based on life expectancy.  If the pensioner dies, 
then his/her dependants inherit a share of the pension.  There are three main different 
types of old age benefits: programmed withdrawal managed by the AFP, immediate 
life annuities managed by insurance companies (pensioner uses the balance to 
purchase an annuity from an insurance company) and a mixture of programmed 
withdrawals and annuity.   
The AFP invests pension contributions in the domestic and foreign capital 
markets and the government, through the Superintendecia de Banca y Seguros, 
supervises closely their performance.    
In contrast to the Chilean system, the Peruvian pension in practice does not 
include a minimum pension guarantee12. The pension benefits are based on the 
worker’s fund accumulation and it also includes an insurance premium covering 
disability and death before retirement that are not payable to contributors who have 
not paid their contributions in four out of the last eight months before the time of 
disability or death.  
The worker contributes with 8% of his/her salary to the pension fund, pays an 
average administrative fee of 2.3% and an average insurance (disability and sudden 
death) fee of 0.9%.  The Peruvian AFP has the highest administrative fee in Latin 
America (1.7% average in 2003). 
 
3. The theoretical framework  
                                                 
12 Only individuals who have contributed regularly for twenty years in any pension system and born 
before 1945 are entitled to the minimum pension at the legal retirement age. 
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The decision to enrol in a pension system can be thought of as one where the 
individual must decide whether or not to purchase an insurance against the risk of loss 
of income during old age. The individual maximises an inter-temporal utility subject 
to a lifetime budget constraint, chooses to participate or not in the pension system and 
as in the case of any good, this decision will be influenced by the prices and 
availability of other substitutes, preferences, income, etc.  
Our theoretical framework aims to compare the situation of an individual with 
and without the pension and has been adapted from Kotikloff and Spivak (1981) and 
Brown (1999) to include some features of the Peruvian private pension system.  For 
simplicity, we ignore bequests, no other form of savings except old age pension, a 
separable consumption function and a constant stream Y of income over time.  
Furthermore, instead of evaluating the optimal consumption plan since birth, we do so 
from the age when the individual enrols in the pension scheme. 
If there is no annuity market, an individual will choose a consumption plan Ct 
so as to: 
Max   ( )txD
0t
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t CUP)U(E ∑−
=
α=      (1) 
subject to  ∑∑ −
=
−−
=
− =
xT
0t
t
xD
0t
t
t RYR C       (2) 
where x is the age of the person at the time of pension enrolment; α=1/(1+δ) and δ is 
the individual subjective rate of time preference; xPt is the probability of survival from 
age x to age x+t; D is the maximum survival age, R=(1+r) and r is the interest rate. 
The right side of equation (2) represents all resource flows received prior to their 
current age and can be interpreted as initial wealth.   
Let  *tx P  be the estimated survival probability by the insurance company.  If 
the individual becomes affiliated to any AFP then the budget constraint changes to: 
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The right hand side of equation (3) equates to the (discounted) life resource flows.   
The first term is labour income received between age x and retirement age T, a is an 
administrative fee rate paid to the AFP and c is the contribution rate. The second term 
is the (discounted) pension B received between age T and D.  The numerator in B 
represents all the resources accumulated by the individual from age x to T, R*=(1+r*) 
and r* is the pension fund rate of return. The denominator in B is the standard formula 
used by the insurance firms to calculate the annuity, Z=(1+z*) and z* is the annuity 
interest rate.   
 Note that if a=c=B=0 and *txtx PP =   (i.e. the estimated probability of survival 
by the individual and the insurance company is the same) then we have the case of a 
‘fair’ annuity market where the ‘cost’ of the annuity is zero.  If this is the case, 
xPt(1+r)-1 could be interpreted as the price of future consumption and the individual 
will always prefer to affiliate because future consumption with affiliation is 
equivalent to the case of no-affiliation but with lower prices given that all Pt are less 
than one except Po which is equal to 1.  This is the so-called, ‘annuity puzzle’ but 
there are several factors that can decrease the value of the annuities such as 
administrative costs, heterogeneity in the survival probability of the population, 
divergence in the perceptions of the population and the insurance companies 
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concerning survival probabilities, informal family safety nets that might substitute 
formal social security, etc. 
Assume a constant relative risk aversion utility function γ−=
γ−
1
C)C(U
1
t
t where γ 
is the relative risk aversion parameter and obtain the indirect utility of not enrolling in 
the pension system by substituting the optimal consumption plan of an individual not 
affiliated in (1)  
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Similarly, the indirect utility of participating is 
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 Analogous to the equivalent variation in welfare analysis, one way of 
evaluating the gains from affiliation is to calculate the increase (in monetary terms) of 
utility derived from affiliation.   Let M be the percentage increase in income that will 
make the individual indifferent between affiliating or not.  That is,  
                    H0(M Y) = V0(Y)        (6) 
Then, a positive M represents gains from affiliation, and the larger it is, the larger the 
gains.    
Next, we examine the effects on M of changes in pension contribution rate (c), 
administrative fees (a), return of the pension fund (R*), annuity rate (Z), risk aversion 
(γ) rate of time preference (δ,) gender and life expectancy.  These variables are of 
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interest because they are related to individual characteristics and the way the SSP is 
managed. 
Applying comparative statics, we can promptly show that the 0
a
M <∂
∂ , 
0
*R
M >∂
∂  and  0
Z
M >∂
∂ . In other words the higher the administrative fees, the lower the 
gains from affiliation hence low fees could encourage individuals to affiliate to an 
AFP.  But the higher the return on the pension fund (r*) and the higher the annuity 
interest rate (z*), the larger M needed to compensate for not taking out a pension.   
However,  
c
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 being larger (or 
smaller) than   ∑−
=
−xT
0j
jR .  When R*>R, then the enlarge retirement pension in the future 
compensates for the loss of utility arising form larger contributions.  However, there 
is no reason to assume that the person discounts consumption higher than the factor 
R* or Z.  If we assume that R*=R=Z, then the effect of the contribution rate on M is 
always negative. 
It is tedious but possible to show that 0M >γ∂
∂  and 0M <δ∂
∂ .  As expected, the 
more risk averse an individual is, the larger the gains from affiliation. But when the 
time preference rate is very high as in the case of poor people, the gains from the 
affiliation may decrease or even be negative and affiliation is less probable. Indeed, 
Packard et al (2002) argue that, especially for the poor and self-employed, the 
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decision not to affiliate can be a rational choice because it may limit their capacity to 
smooth consumption.  
The gains from affiliation also vary depending on age and gender.  Given the 
nature of the functions involved, their effects on M are more conveniently simulated13 
rather than using comparative statics.    Figure 1 shows that as expected, women have 
lower gains from affiliation because of lower mortality compared to men.   Similarly, 
in figure 2, the gains are less for younger than older people because of their lower 
mortality in the near future.   
Finally, we simulate the effect on M of a discrepancy between the ‘true’ 
survival rate and the ‘official’ survival rate used by the AFP. We assume 
heterogeneity of survival in the Peruvian population so that on average, they live less 
than the  ‘official’ estimates14.    Similar to the AFP, we use a Gompertz function to 
calculate different ‘true’ survival probabilities Pt by changing the deterioration rate 
parameter. The official deterioration rate parameters are 0.999214025 and 
0.999525667 for males between 20 and 70 years old and between 70 and 110 years 
old respectively.  Figure 3 shows that the larger the gap between ‘true’ and  ‘official’ 
survival probability, the larger the loss when taking out a pension because individuals 
will not live long enough to receive the full benefits of the pension. In fact, poor 
people tend to have a low survival rate and therefore they will have little incentive to 
participate in the private pension system. 
                                                 
13 Like Brown (1999) and Cifuentes (2000), we assume a standard interest rate and time preference of 
3%. The annuity interest rate is also assumed to be 3% and corresponds to the legal minimum 
profitability requirement. The administrative fee is 2.3%, the contribution rate is 8% and the retirement 
age is 65 years old. The survival probabilities are calculated from the ‘official’ survival tables used by 
both the AFP and the insurance companies (see the appendix for a summary of the formulas and 
survival tables). We also simulated the model using the interest rate and time preference rate obtained 
from a general equilibrium model estimated by Dancourt et al (2004) for the Peruvian economy.  
Although the results were similar, we preferred not to report them because of the very low values of the 
parameters. 
14 Indeed, Olivera (2001) argues that the average survival rate of the Peruvian population is lower than 
the one used by the AFP. 
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Interfamily transfers, common practice in extended families, may implicitly 
reflect incomplete annuity markets or more generally, imperfections in the capital 
market.   These family arrangements are part of a more general form of allocations 
over generations and are associated with forms of exchange within the family15. 
Parents take care of children (education, food, clothes, etc) while they are middle 
aged. When the parents get old, they receive financial or in-kind support from their 
children as a form of exchange or compensation.   Lucas and Stark (1985), Cox and 
Rank (1992) and Victorio (2002), analyse the patterns of intergenerational transfers 
and uncover empirical evidence suggesting that relations of exchange link generations 
within the family.  In particular, Cox et al (1998) find that Peruvian family members 
expecting to receive pensions have a weaker incentive to enter into intergenerational 
arrangements for the purpose of old-age support.  That is, their evidence suggests that 
the existence of informal agreements for old-age support might lower the probability 
of participating in a pension system. 
  In contrast to a formal social security institution where the payment of 
pensions can be legally enforced, informal family arrangements are not enforceable 
and require self-enforcement mechanisms.  For example, Cigno (2000) mentions a set 
of basic principles called ‘family constitution’.  Other researchers, for instance Cox et 
al (1998) argue that family altruism, loyalty and trust are keys to enforce family 
arrangements. Indeed, breaking a promise might be punished with restrictions to 
participate in the family network.  Liquidity restrictions and limited access to the 
credit market also provide incentives to family members to fulfil agreements.  
                                                 
15 See Arrondel and Masson (2004), Laferrere and Wolff (2004) and Stark (1995) for a more 
comprehensive discussion on transfer motives and their implications. 
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 As a result of better information and trust within the family, family risk-
sharing agreements have lower levels of transaction costs, moral hazard, adverse 
selection and deception than those found in conventional insurance markets (Kotikloff 
and Spivak, 1981).  Moreover, Packard et al (2002) point out that informal social 
security might be superior to a pension system because the former covers a broader 
range of risks and is more flexible so it could be tailored according to the needs of the 
individual. 
 
4. Empirical specification, data and hypothesis 
We are interested in examining how both personal and family characteristics 
as well as the existence of family based arrangements affect the probability of 
enrolment in pension schemes.  Our dependent variable is a binary latent variable yi* 
which takes the value of 1 if the individual i is enrolled in any AFP and zero 
otherwise. The model is 
ik
K
0k
k
*
i Xy ε+β=∑
=
    where  
Specifically,   Pr (affiliationi=1) = f (Xi) + εi  
where Xi includes individual and household characteristics affecting  Mi  and other 
covariates Zi.  Assuming that εi is normally distributed with zero mean, we estimate a 
probit equation using maximum likelihood. 
We use data from the National Survey of Households – Living Standards and 
Poverty (ENAHO) conducted by the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica e Informatica 
(INEI) during the fourth quarter of 2001. This survey contains socio-economic 
information pertaining to households and their members. The sample size consists of 
yi = 
1     if  y*i > 0;
0     Otherwise
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16,515 households including 76,635 people and it is representative at the national, 
urban, rural and departmental levels.  
We drop all individuals who were compulsorily enrolled.  Furthermore, we 
only include individuals belonging to the economically active population and exclude 
those belonging to extremely poor16 households. The final sample size is 22,076.  Our 
unit of analysis is the individual and we account for individuals belonging to the same 
household by clustering.  
There are two main characteristics of our sample that must be kept in mind. 
The first one is related to the definition of our dependent variable.  As stated earlier, 
we exclude individuals who were compulsorily enrolled in an AFP.  The ENAHO IV- 
2001 specifically asks if the individual belongs to the private pension scheme (SPP) 
but does not directly ask if he/she belongs to the public pension system (SNP)17.  
There are only two pension systems in Peru so we can indirectly infer if a person 
belongs to the SNP.  A person not participating in the SPP but paying monthly 
pension contributions is classified as one belonging to the SNP and is excluded from 
the sample.   
The second characteristic is related to the effects of occupations on the 
probability of participation in an AFP. An individual might change occupations over 
his/her working life.  Therefore, it might not be true that an individual who is enrolled 
and holds an independent occupation (e.g. self-employed) has voluntarily chosen to 
                                                 
16 The INEI classifies Peruvian households into extreme poor, poor and non-poor according to poverty 
lines based on expenditure thresholds: minimum food calorie intake for the case of extreme poverty 
and minimum goods and services for the case of poverty.  We have also performed the regression 
including the extreme poor and the results do not change qualitatively.  However, given that the 
extreme poor is not able to choose between enrolling in a pension scheme or not, we decided to present 
only the results excluding them. 
17 The ENAHO IV-2002 asked if the interviewee belonged to any pension system. Given that the 
public pension system is gradually being replaced by the private system and that our interest is in 
explaining participation in the reformed system, we preferred to use ENAHO IV-2001 where the 
question was specifically asked with reference to the private pension system. 
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affiliate. For instance, a self-employed individual who participates in the pension 
system at the time of the survey could have enrolled during his/her previous 
dependent job. Unaccounted changes from dependent to independent jobs (and vice 
versa) might introduce biases in the analysis. Table 3, based on data from ENAHO 
shows that 77% of the self-employed in the fourth quarter of 2001 were compulsorily 
enrolled.   We decide not to use occupations as predictors for the probability of 
affiliation because of the mismatch between actual occupation and the timing of 
enrolment.  For similar reasons and given the lack of data to disentangle chronic from 
temporary unemployment, we did not include ‘unemployed’ as a regressor.  Instead, 
we rely on the characteristics of the individual (age, gender, marital status and 
education) to indirectly control for the employment/occupation status.    
In view of our theoretical framework and data availability, we formulate the 
following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Age has a positive and non-linear effect on the probability of 
pension affiliation. 
 We expect a positive effect of age on affiliation. However, since the pension 
in the SPP depends directly on the length of the period in which contributions are 
made, it is possible that old workers might not have an incentive to affiliate in the SPP 
because they will not have enough time to accumulate funds and end up with a 
desirable pension. Therefore, we expect a non-linear relation between age and 
affiliation. 
Hypothesis 2:  
Individuals with more investment in human capital and belonging to 
households with higher income per capita have a higher propensity to 
participate in the pension system. 
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 We expect that more educated individuals living in households with higher 
per capita income will have a higher probability of affiliation because they would be 
better able to smooth consumption and allocate resources for social security. 
We include variables to signal different education levels (postgraduate, 
undergraduate, vocational, secondary and less than secondary education), but note 
that in Peru a large proportion of the population are not adequately employed. In our 
sample, only 37% of the university graduates are employed in professional type 
occupations. Therefore, we include an interaction dummy, university*non-
professional job, which takes the value of 1 if the individual has a university degree 
and does not have a professional job.  If the person is unemployed, then we 
considered his/her previous job type.  We also include income related proxies such as 
household income per capita and a variable indicating whether any member of the 
household has liquid assets. 
Hypothesis 3:  
The existence of an extended family and a large nuclear family with a high 
proportion of young and old members reduces the likelihood of affiliation.  
The effects of informal arrangements fpr old-age security on the probability of 
affiliation can be indirectly examined by using the number of household members, 
proportion of children (less than 14 years old) and elderly (over 65 years old) in the 
household, and the existence of an extended family.    Also the influence of other 
members of the household  (captured by the participation of other household members 
in the SPP) increases the probability of affiliation.   
Hypothesis 4:  
Family transfers decrease the likelihood of affiliation. 
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As explained in the previous section, there are several reasons why family 
transfers might occur.  One motive might be  ‘exchange’ i.e. a family gives something 
because they expect to receive something in return18.   These intergenerational 
transfers are evidence that the family is engaged in informal social security schemes 
with children giving transfers to parents and vice-versa. Therefore the existence of 
these arrangements in the family may reduce the probability of affiliation.  
Unfortunately we do not have data on intergenerational transfers.  Rather than 
parent-children transfers, we use a proxy to measure the effect of transfers on the 
probability of pension affiliation.  Our data includes information on provision and 
receipt of family transfers from and to other family members living outside the 
household. Therefore, our results should be treated with some caution. We expect that 
an individual belonging to a household that receives or gives these transfers is less 
likely to affiliate to a pension scheme.  
We also include dummy variables for gender, marital status, head of 
household and holding private health insurance.  These covariates are included to 
control for risk perception and women’s expected value of the future pension, which 
depends on their own accumulated funds (working women are typically less well paid 
than men and are more likely to be interrupted in their careers) and the survivor 
benefits for married women.  We also add controls to signal if the household is above 
the poverty level, if it is located in the urban or rural area and if other members of the 
household are enrolled in the SPP, are pensioners and have life insurance.  Note that 
the results should be interpreted with certain caution because some of these control 
variables are potentially endogenous, and unfortunately we could not apply 
                                                 
18 See Cox et al. (1998) and Bhaumik and Nugent (2000) for an interesting analysis of Peruvian family 
exchange relations.  
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instrumental variables because of lack of suitable instruments.   In particular, holding 
a private health insurance might be endogenous but given the deficient Peruvian 
public health system, it is plausible to assume that the decision to enrolling in a 
pension scheme is subsequent to that of subscribing to a private health insurance 
scheme.    
Tables 4 and 5 present the definition and descriptive statistics of the variables 
used in this study.  We compare the means of our variables and all the means between 
the voluntary affiliated and non-affiliated groups are statistically different except for 
the means of extended family and head*female.   
 
5. The empirical results 
Table 6 presents our results.  Overall, the signs of the estimated coefficients 
are as expected.  As expected in hypothesis 1, age (and age squared) has a positive 
(negative) and significant effect on the probability of affiliation. The education 
variables and variables related to household income have an important effect on the 
probability of affiliation and lend support to hypothesis 2. In particular, holding a 
postgraduate degree increases the affiliation probability by 6.7% while a university 
degree increase it by 5.4%. Thus, the larger investment in human capital, the greater 
the chance of enrolling in an AFP. However, if the individual holds a university 
degree and works in a non-professional occupation (for example, taxi drivers), then 
the probability of affiliation decreases.  Individuals from households with both higher 
income per capita and in possession of liquid assets have a higher and significant 
probability of affiliation.  The effect of household income per capita on the 
probability of affiliation is non-linear. 
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Married people have a positive and statistically significant larger probability of 
enrolment than singles.  Gender by itself was found to be insignificant but the 
interaction gender*marital status exerted a negative influence on the affiliation 
probability.  Married women have more transient jobs and lower income mainly 
because of childbearing, so they have a lower probability of affiliation.  
The positive estimated coefficient of private health insurance suggests that it 
complements membership in a pension scheme. This can reflect wealth and/or proxy a 
higher degree of risk aversion.  
Risk behaviour of other household members is also important in explaining 
pension enrolment. We have found positive and statistically significant effects on 
affiliation when i) any member of the household has life insurance ii) there are any 
other members enrolled in an AFP and iii) any other member is a pensioner.  These 
results can be interpreted as andimitation effect’.  That is members of the household 
learn about the advantages of formal insurance schemes from other members already 
belonging to such schemes.  Nevertheless, these results might suggest that informal 
social security agreements are not in place when various members of the household 
participate in formal social security arrangements. 
 With respect to hypothesis 3, only the number of household members is 
statistically significant and has the expected negative sign. However, we have to be 
cautious when interpreting family size. The number of household members might not 
be a good proxy for the extent of an informal social security safety net.  Packard et al 
(2002) argue that larger households might have to share resources with more members 
and this effect might reduce the probability of affiliation in an AFP. The percentage of 
elderly members in the family and the existence of an extended family affect the 
probability of affiliation with unexpected positive signs but they are insignificant.  
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In terms of hypothesis 4, our results suggest a negative effect of the household 
receiving transfer and providing transfers on the probability of affiliation, but only the 
former is statistically significant19. This might be signalling not only exchange related 
issues between relatives but also that those receiving transfers are in more need than 
those providing them.    
We assess the extent of the bias introduced by not distinguishing between 
voluntary and compulsory affiliation. We retested the model and compared the 
predicted probabilities (evaluated at the mean of the individual characteristics) with 
and without this distinction. If we are unable to identify the nature of the affiliation, 
the unweighted predicted probability of participating in the pension system is 15 times 
higher than when we exclude all those who were ‘forced’ to participate20.  To control 
for different sample size, we weight21 the respective predicted probabilities by the 
inverse of the actual percentage of enrolled persons in each sample. The weighted 
difference is 30%. 
 
6. Conclusions  
We have examined the decision to participate in the pension system in Peru 
including all those individuals for whom the decision to affiliate is voluntary.  
Overall, our results support our hypothesis. Given the large ‘informal’ or independent 
sector in Peru, the pension coverage is limited and restricted to a selected group of 
                                                 
19 Before including the dummy variables receiving transfers and providing transfers, we tested the 
model with only one dummy variable which took the value of 1 if the household was providing or 
receiving transfers and zero otherwise.  We found that this variable exerted a negative and significant 
effect on the probability of affiliation and that the estimated coefficients of the other regressors remain 
almost the same so we decided not to report the results.   
20 In the sample that includes voluntary and compulsory membership to the private pension scheme, the 
predicted probability (evaluated at average characteristics) is 7.5% which contrasts with 0.51% found 
in our restricted sample.  
21 The weights are 14.8% and 1.3% for the whole and restricted sample respectively. 
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individuals. Only married males with at least secondary education, belonging to 
households with higher income per capita and with other family members already 
participating in the pension system, have a higher likelihood of participation.  
Moreover, our results also suggest that family based safety nets have a 
negative effect on the probability of pension participation and that care for the elderly 
in Peru is in serious jeopardy.  Family arrangements tend to substitute for formal 
social security membership but in the long run, taking into account the ‘aging 
phenomenon’, we cannot be certain of the effectiveness of these family-based safety 
nets. 
One way to increase pension coverage is the creation of more ‘formal’ or dependent 
jobs.  But this is a structural, long-term and cumbersome task.  As mentioned earlier, 
the Peruvian pension in practice does not include a minimum pension guarantee so 
another way might be for the government to provide, similar to Chile, a means-tested 
welfare pension for low-income people that have not participated in the pension 
scheme and also a minimum guarantee for people that have contributed to the system 
but have not been able to accumulate enough to achieve a minimum threshold 
pension. The problem here is not related only to large fiscal costs but also to moral 
hazard and appropriate incentives.  As suggested in our theoretical analysis, other 
more plausible policies to increase the coverage are to lower the administrative fees 
charged by the AFP and to narrow the differences between the ‘official’ survival 
probability rates used by the AFP in their pension calculations and the ‘true’ survival 
probability rate of the average Peruvians.    In addition, note that higher pension fund 
returns and higher annuity interest rates make the retirement pension more attractive.  
Therefore, regulation on investments made by both pension funds and insurance firms 
should be carefully designed in order to safeguard pensioners’ contributions and also 
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provide enough flexibility to help managers to follow optimal investment strategies. 
These and the effectiveness and sustainability of the informal family arrangements are 
matters for future research. 
Finally, our findings must be taken with some caution due to data limitations. 
Some of our covariates might be potentially endogenous. Lack of savings data 
precludes us from examining the relation between savings and pension affiliation. In 
addition, we do not have a measure of intergenerational transfers but only data related 
to family transfers from and to other family members living outside the household. It 
would be desirable to have more detailed survey data to explore the effects of 
informal family safety nets on the decision to participate in the formal social security 
system and also to have a history of contributions to be able to assess the extent of 
effective coverage and the problem of old age vulnerability.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1 
Pension coverage in Latin America 2003 
 Percentage of EAP Percentage of Population 
 Affiliated Contributors Affiliated Contributors 
Argentina 58.8 20.7 24.6 8.7 
Bolivia 22.9 11.9 9.3 4.8 
Colombia 28.6 13.9 11.7 5.7 
Costa Rica 75.1 --- 29.5 --- 
Chile 105.4 54.7 44.2 22.9 
Dominican Republic 20.8 17.2 9.4 7.8 
El  Salvador 35.8 16.6 16.2 7.5 
Mexico 71.8 28.7 30.4 12.2 
Peru  30.1 12.2 11.8 4.8 
Uruguay 41.2 21.7 18.7 9.8 
Weighted averagea 55.8 23.6 23.3 9.7 
a. Weighted by EAP or population 
Sources: ECLAC, ILO, International Federation of Pension Funds Administrators. 
 
Table 2 
Social security participation in Peru (December, % of the EAP) 
 SPP SNP TOTAL 
 Affiliates Contributors Affiliates Contributors Affiliates Contributors 
1993 7.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1994 11.7 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1995 13.4 n.a. n.a. 7.2 n.a. n.a. 
1996 17.9 n.a. n.a. 6.8 n.a. n.a. 
1997 19.5 8.3 a n.a. 7.4 n.a. 15.6 
1998 21.6 9.8 n.a. 6.2 n.a. 16.1 
1999 23.6 10.8 n.a. 5.3 n.a. 16.1 
2000 25.4 10.6 n.a. 4.5 n.a. 15.1 
2001 27.6 11.3 8.0 4.3 35.6 15.6 
2002 29.4 11.5 8.3 4.4 37.7 15.9 
2003 30.3 12.7 8.7 4.5 39.0 17.1 
2004 b 30.7 12.2  8.9 4.1 39.6 16.3 
a. End of March 
b. End of July, except for contributors to the SPP which is end of May 
n.a. Not available 
Sources: ILO, Superintendencia de Banca y Seguros del Peru.  
 
Table 3 
Current occupation and type of affiliation (number of people) 
 Occupation at time of affiliation  
Actual occupation Compulsory affiliated Voluntary affiliated Total 
Employer 67 39 106 
Self-employed 262 77 339 
Employee 3071 142 3213 
Unpaid family worker  26 8 34 
Household worker 13 5 18 
Other 2 1 3 
Total 3441 272 3713 
Source: ENAHO-2001-IV 
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Table 4 
Definition of variables 
 
Variable  Definition 
Individual characteristics  
Age  Age in years  
Gender Female=1, 0 otherwise 
Marital status Married=1, 0 otherwise 
Married*Female Female and married=1, 0 otherwise 
Head Head of household=1, 0 otherwise 
Head*Female Head of household and female=1, 0 otherwise 
Postgraduate  Postgraduate education=1, 0 otherwise 
University   University education=1, 0 otherwise 
Vocational Technical or vocational education=1, 0 otherwise 
Secondary Secondary education=1, 0 otherwise 
University*non-professional University educated and no professional job=1, 0 otherwise 
Private health insurance Individual holds a private health insurance =1, 0 otherwise 
Household characteristics  
HH income per capita Natural logarithm income per capita of the household.  
Liquid asset gains Liquid asset gains are interests from deposits and loans, 
dividends from shares and equities and firm profits received in 
the last year by any member of the household. Any member of 
household receiving liquid asset gains=1, 0 otherwise 
HH is non poor Household non-poor=1, 0 otherwise 
Urban  Household located in urban area =1, 0 otherwise 
HH size Number of members in the household  
Young depend  Proportion below 14 years old in the household  
Old depend  Proportion over 65 years old in the household  
Extended family Any relative in household but not nuclear family=1, 0 
otherwise  
Receiving family transfers  Transfers and remittances from relatives in other households 
and received by any member of the household during the last 6 
months.  Receiving transfers=1, 0 otherwise.   
Providing family transfers  Transfers and remittances provided by any member of the 
household to relatives living in other households during the last 
3 months.  Providing transfers=1, 0 otherwise.  
Receiving or providing family 
transfers  
Receiving or providing transfers=1, 0 otherwise 
Other members in the SPP Other member of the household (except the interviewee) 
enrolled in the SPP=1 and 0 otherwise. 
Receiving pensions Any member of the household receiving a pension during the 
last six months=1, 0 otherwise. 
Holding a life insurance  Any member of the household paying life insurance during the 
last 3 months=1 and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 5 
Descriptive statistics   
 
 
Variable Voluntarily affiliated Non-affiliated 
  Mean S.D. Mean S.D.  
Individual characteristics     
Age 41.1 13.3 36.7 15.8 
Age squared 1862.5 1199.1 1597.8 1358.9 
Gender 0.347 0.477 0.461 0.499 
Marital status 0.684 0.466 0.555 0.497 
Head 0.542 0.499 0.382 0.486 
Head*Female 0.063 0.242 0.072 0.258 
Private health insurance 0.066 0.249 0.011 0.102 
Postgraduate  0.024 0.154 0.001 0.037 
University 0.330 0.471 0.065 0.246 
Vocational 0.205 0.404 0.088 0.283 
Secondary 0.281 0.450 0.453 0.498 
University*Non-professional 0.108 0.310 0.042 0.200 
     
Household characteristics     
HH income per capita 7.254 0.765 6.585 0.735 
HH income per capita squared 53.207 11.396 43.896 9.927 
Liquid asset gains 0.125 0.331 0.029 0.168 
HH is non poor 0.868 0.339 0.592 0.491 
Urban  0.885 0.319 0.687 0.464 
HH size 4.729 1.957 5.106 2.422 
Young depend 0.218 0.198 0.234 0.203 
Old depend 0.075 0.164 0.073 0.187 
Extended family 0.413 0.493 0.400 0.490 
Receiving family transfers 0.281 0.450 0.380 0.485 
Providing family transfers 0.299 0.458 0.215 0.411 
Receiving or providing family transfers 0.503 0.501 0.514 0.500 
Other members in the SSP 0.438 0.497 0.177 0.382 
Receiving pensions 0.063 0.242 0.013 0.111 
Holding a life insurance 0.135 0.343 0.027 0.163 
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Table 6  
Probability of affiliation to the private pension system 
 
 Variable Coeff Robust S.E. dF/dX Mean 
Individual characteristics     
Age  0.040*** 0.011 0.001 36.8 
Age squared  0.0003*** 0.000 -0.5E-5 1601.6 
Gender -0.022 0.105 -0.3E-3 0.46 
Marital status  0.270*** 0.094  0.004 0.56 
Married*female -0.246* 0.131 -0.003 0.25 
Head  0.059 0.104  0.001 0.39 
Head*Female  0.082 0.146  0.001 0.07 
Private health insurance  0.260* 0.133  0.005 0.01 
Postgraduate   1.112*** 0.261  0.067 0.00 
University  1.074*** 0.112  0.054 0.07 
Vocational  0.628*** 0.100  0.018 0.09 
Secondary  0.154* 0.082  0.002 0.45 
University*Non-professional -0.545*** 0.115 -0.004 0.04 
Household characteristics     
HH income per capita  1.477*** 0.527  0.022 6.60 
HH income per capita squared -0.091*** 0.035 -0.001 44.0 
Liquid asset gains  0.250** 0.105  0.005 0.03 
HH is non poor  0.092 0.085  0.001 0.60 
Urban   0.036 0.091  0.001 0.69 
HH size -0.030* 0.015 -0.4E-3 5.10 
Young depend  0.314* 0.169  0.005 0.23 
Old depend  0.055 0.166   0.001 0.07 
Extended family  0.081 0.064   0.001 0.40 
Receiving family transfers -0.154*** 0.060 -0.002 0.38 
Providing family transfers -0.032 0.061 -0.001 0.22 
Other members in SSP  0.333*** 0.072  0.007 0.18 
Receiving pensions  0.329** 0.145  0.007 0.01 
Holding a life insurance  0.424*** 0.100  0.011 0.03 
Constant -9.586*** 1.900   
Number of observations  22076  
Pseudo R2  0.1937  
Pseudo-likelihood -1231.40  
chi2  535.9(27)  
prob>chi2  0.0  
White/Hubert standard errors 
*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10% 
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Assumptions 
Figure 1 
Gender 
Age 25 
Retirement age 65 
r=r*=z* 3% 
Survival probabilities  Appendix 
a 2.3% 
c 8% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
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Appendix  
 
Survival tables used in the Peruvian private pension system  
 
The probability of survival xPt from age x to age x+t is defined as:  
xPt = lx+1/lx 
where lx is the quantity of survivors of a given population and depends on the 
assumed behaviour of the mortality rate.  Assume an initial population (lI) formed by 
100,000 individuals (all of them with the same age I) who can live to a maximum age 
D (110 years old) and, as it is the case in Peru, assume that the mortality rate (mx) 
follows a Gompertz function.   Then,  
∏−
=
=
1x
Ii
ix ml    when x>I ,   otherwise lI = 100,000      
where 
( )1cc
x
x
gsm −=  and  s, g (i.e. deterioration parameter) and c are parameters 
that under the  Peruvian pension and insurance regulation take the following values 
Age Parameter Men Women 
From 20 to 70 c 1.089736350 1.098531565
 g 0.999214025 0.999767311
 s 0.999738701 0.999834258
    
From 70 to 110 c 1.096209882 1.112837803
 g 0.999525667 0.999923115
 s 0.999140668 0.998779052
  
Therefore, xPt can be viewed as ∏−+
=
=
1tx
xi
itx mP  for any t>=1. 
